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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2897 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION OF 
VIRGINIA, Appellant, 
versus 
THE UNION LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY., INCORPO-
RATED, Appellee. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme 
Court of .Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Unemployment Compensation Commission 
of Virginia, respectfully represents unto the Court that it is 
aggrieved by a final decree of the Chancery Court of the City 
of Richmond rendered against your petitioner on the fifth 
day of June, 1944, in a certain statutory proceeding by way 
of a petition for review to that Court from a decision o'f Jno. 
~. Rhodes, Jr., sole Commissioner of the Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission of Virginia, which proceeding was un-
der the provisions of Section 7(a) of the Virginia Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act, as amended, being Section 1887(99)-
(a) of the Code (l\Iichie's) for 1942. 
A transcript of the record in the trial court, with the ex-
hibits filed therewith, is herewith presented. The appel-
28 lant in this Court was the defendant •in the lower court. 
Since the Unemployment Compensation Commission of 
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Virginia is a one-man Commission we will ref er to the deci-
sion in this cause as the decision of the Commissioner. 
I. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT. 
This is a proceeding under Section 7(a) of the Unemploy-
ment Compensation .A.ct (Code Section 1887(99) (a)), which 
exp1·essly confers jurisdiction on this Court in the following 
language: · 
"An appeal may be taken from the decision of such court 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals, in conformity with general 
law governing appeals in equity cases., and without regard to 
the amount involved." 
TI. 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER TRIBUNALS. 
The case was commenced upon the motion of the Commis-
sioner under the provisions of Section 1887(99)(a) of the 
Virginia Code (Michie's) for 1942. ·The purpose of the pro-
ceeding, as set forth in the notice served upon the Appellee, 
was to determine "the status under the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act of Virginia *) • * of all industrial insurance 
agents of Union Life Insurance Company, a Corporation, who 
have been engaged in the performance of the operations of 
said corporation at any time since December 31, 1939 • .., 8 ." 
Counsel for tlie Life Insurance Company and the Assistant 
Attorney General, representing the Commissioner, submitted 
the matter to the Commissioner upon an agreed Stipulation 
of Facts (R., p. 8). The Commissioner handed down his de-
cision on November 5, 1942, in whicl1 lie held that "the indi-
viduals engaged by the Union Life Insurance Company 
3• and desib"llated as agents in the stipulation filed •herein, 
are not performing all their services for said company 
as insurance agents and as insurance solicitors, and that the 
individuals who accepted the plan of compensation put into 
effect on May 23, 1940, are not remunerated solely by way of 
commission.'' In said decision the Commissioner directed 
the Life Insurance Company to file "wage reports with the 
Commission showing all the earnings up to $3.,000 in any one 
calendar year with respect to each individual in its employ-
ment after December 31, 1939, and designated in the stipula-
tion filed herein as agents, and to pay the contributions as-
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sessable against it on account thereof, and in every respect 
comply with all the laws, rules and regulations of the Com-
mission pertaining to employing units adjudged and deter-
mined to be employers under the Virginia Unemployment 
Compensation Act.'' 
From the decision of, the Commissioner the Life Insurance 
Company filed its petition for review in the Chancery Court 
of the City of Richmond. The Commission filed its answer 
including as a part thereof the transcript of record before the 
Commissioner, consisting· of the notice, stipulation of facts, 
the findings of fact, and the decision of the Commissioner. 
Subsequently, the Insurance Company filed its amended peti-
tion to which the Commission filed its answer. · The lower 
court reversed the Commissioner ( except on one single point 
as will hereinafter appear) by its decree of June 5, 1944 (R., 
p. 26), from which decree this appeal is sought. 
III. 
THE FACTS. 
The Union Life Insurance Company is a Virginia Corpora-
tion with its principal office in Richmond. It is engaged in 
writing industrial life and industrial sick benefit insur-
ance. 
4(1 · @Prior to January 1, 194.0, the Company conceded that 
its agents were in employment under the provisions of 
the Unemployment Compensation Act then in effect, and the 
interpretation of the law as made by this Court in the case of 
Life and Casualty Insurance Company v~ Unemployment Com-
pe1isation Commission, 178 Va. 57, 16 S. E. (2d) 36. In March, 
1940, the General Assembly of Virginia amended the Unem-
ployment Compensation Act as of January 1, 1940, so as to 
exclude from coverag·c under the Act insurance agents and 
insurance solicitors if all tl1eir service as such is performed 
for remuneration solely by way. of commission-Code 
(Michie's) Section 1887(94)(j)(7)(N). On account of this 
amendment tl1e Insurance Company ceased paying unemploy-
ment compensation payroll tax to the Virginia Commission 
on the earnings of all of its agents, but continued to pay such 
tax on the earnings of its officers, office employees, mann!!;ers 
and assistant managers, as it concedes that such individuals 
are remunerated on a fixed salarv basis. 
Prior to May 23, 1940, the usuai way employed by the Com-
pany to remunerate all its agents was by paying them a 
definite percentage on the amounts of premiums collected by 
them and turned in to the Company. On that date the Com-
- __ .. ,; 
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pany put into effect a new plan of remuneration., and invited 
all the agents to accept the plan. Most of them did, but some 
preferred to continue on the old basis of being remunerated 
by being paid a definite percentage of the amount of the 
premiums collected by them. All of the agents are of the 
type ordinarily termed '' debit collectors.'' A debit consists 
of the list of the weekly premiums payable by policy holders. 
The agent, or debit collector, is given such a list and is ex-
pected to call on the policy holders periodically and collect 
the premiums. The agent has the right and is expected to sell 
new policies, thus increasing the size of his debit, subject to 
losses by lapses. On the sale of a policy the agent receives 
a commission in addition to his remuneration for servicing 
tlie debit. He mav have a net increase or a net loss 
5• "'or depreciation of the size of his debit during any one 
week, depending on whether the collectable premiums 
added to the debit exceed the lapses. . 
There is an understanding between each agent and the 
company that the agent must collect at least an average of 
95% of his weekly debit during each wenk and that his failure 
so to do, unless occasioned through sickness or other satis-
factory reason, will result in the termination of his relation-
ship with the Company. · 
During 1940 and 1941 and the first five months of 1942 (to 
the time of the commencement of this proceeding) the agents 
average collecting 97.24 per cent of their respective debits. 
The agent's duties, as set forth in the stipulation, are ''to 
collect and account for bis weekly debit, to cause policies on 
his debit which are in arrears past the grace period to be 
lapsed by the Company, to solicit and obtain applications 
for new policies and submit such applications to the Company 
for approval and issuance, and to deliver new policies to the 
respective insureds upon issuance.'' · 
The method of remuneration under the plan inaugurated 
on ·May 23, 1940, is set forth in the stipulation as follows: 
"An agent working in a city receives remuneration based 
upon his debit as follows: 
"a. If his debit during any week is less than $100, he re-
ceives a commission of $20 for such week. 
''b. If his debit during any week is between $100 and $110, 
he receives a commission of $22.50 for such week. 
"c. If his debit during any week is between $110 and $120, 
he receives a commission of $23.50 for such week. 
"d. If his debit during any week is over $120, he receives 
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a commission of $23.50 plus $1 for each $10 of debit 
6ci in sexcess of $120. 
"An agent working in the country receives remuneration 
based upon his debit as follows: 
'' a. If liis debit during any week is less than $100, he re-
ceives a commission of $22.50 for such week. 
"b. If his debit during any week is between $100 and $110, 
he receives a commission of $27.50 for such week. 
"c. If his debit during any week is between $110 and $120, 
he receives a commission of $28.50 for such week. 
"d. If his debit during any week is over $120, he receives 
a commission of $28.50 plus $1 for each $10 of debit in excess 
of $120. · 
"As further special remuneration under the plan imrngu-
rated on :May 23, 1940, wl1enever au agent has a 'weekly 
premium net increase' during any week, he receives as special 
remuneration for that week n sum equal to 15 times on one-
half of such 'weekly premium net increase', but sucl1 special 
remuneration for such week shall not exceed $10. One-hnlf 
of such 'weekly premium net increase' for such week is then 
placed in a reserve account. " 7heneve1· the agent has accumu-
lated more than $10 in such reserve account, be may be paid 
an ncldition:il remuneration 15 times on up to $1 out of such re-
serve account each week whether he during such weeks makes 
any 'weeklv premium net increase' or not, Ro Ion,:? as he still 
maintains at least $10 in such reserve account. Thus, if tlle 
agent has a 'weekly premium net increase' of $1 for a given 
week, he receives special remuneration for such week of 15 
times 50 cents or $7.50. One-lrnlf of this 'weekly premium 
net increase' then goes into the said 'i·eserve account'. This 
procedure continues from week to week. Suppose by virtue 
of these increases the reserve nccount of the agent has now 
reached $12. The next week he can draw above his other 
remuneration a sum eQual to l 5 times $1, or $15. This of 
course reduces the said reserve account lJy $1 dovm to $11. 
He can do the same the next week, even though he has no 
'weekly premium net increase' for that week, fo1· lie still 
r lms $1 over •the required $10 in his reserve account ancl 
is accordingly entitled to receive 15 times such $1, or $15. 
But this reduces tbc reserve account down to $10, so that he 
can clraw no .further remuneration by virtue of the reserve 
account until h.e has increased tlm reserve account above $10 
througl1 liis later 'weekly premium net increases' as above 
set out." 
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IV. 
DECISION OF TRIAL COURT. 
The judgment of the trial. court is that the decision of the 
Commissioner entered on November 5, 1942, be reversed; that 
the services of each agent of the Company who accepted the 
plan effective May 23, 1940, constitute employment under the 
Act for each calendar year subsequent to December 31, 1939, 
in which the debit of such agent for any week is less than 
$100; that the se1:vices of each agent of the company who ac-
cepted the said plan do not constitute employment under the 
Act for each calendar year subsequent to December 31, 1939, 
in which the debit of such agent for each ,and every week is 
$100 or more. 
V. 
THE ISSUE. 
By reference to the method of corµpensation of the agents 
who accepted the plan, it will be observed that there are four 
categories for the city agents and four for the country agents, 
designated as a, b, c, and d. The Trial Court has held that the 
agents in categories b., c, and d are not in employment .. The 
sole issue now before this Court is whether or not the agents 
in the categories b, c, and dare in employment under the Un-
employment Compensation Act. 
VI. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
Your petitioner assigns the following error: 
s• *The Court erred in l1olding that the services of each 
agent of the Union Life Insurance Company who accepted 
the plan inaugurated May 23, 1940, do not constitute "em-
ployment" under the Virginia Unemployment Compensation 
Act for each calendar year subsequent to December 31, 1939, 
in which the debit of such agent for each and every week is 
$100 or more. 
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VII. 
ARGUMENT. 
In t11e case of Life and CasualtJ1 Insurance Company v. Un-
employment Compensatfon Commission of Virginia, .r;;upra, 
this Court held that industrial life insurance agents were in 
employment under the Act. The General Assembly of Vir-
ginia amended the Act effective as of .January 1, 1940, so as 
to contain t]1e following exception to employment: 
"The term 'employment' after December thirty-first, nine-
teen hundred and tl1irty-nine, shall not include: 
"Service performed by an individual for an employing unit 
as an insurance agent or as an insurance solicitor, if all such 
service performed by such individual for such employing unit 
is performed for remunerntion solely by way of commis-
sion. "-Code (Michie's) Section 1887(94)(j)(7)(N). 
The question to be decided by this Court is whether an 
agent of the Union Life Insurance Company whose debit for 
each week in a calendar vear is $100 or more is not in "em-
ployment'' by reason of the foregoinA' amendment. 
The amendment is an exemption from taxation. It is a 
firmly established principle of law that one claiming the bene- · 
fits of a tax exemption statute must bear the burden of show-
ing affirmatively that he comes squarely within the terms of 
the exemption. Thus., in Life and Casu,alty Insurance Com-
pany v. Unem,plo:11ment Compensation Commi.r;;sion, of Vir-
ginia, supra, Mr .• Justice Gregory states: 
9(t "'" The burden is upon the appellant (Insurance Com-
pany) to show tliat the service rendered it by them (the 
agents) for remuneration docs not constitute employment un-
der the Act." 
In 25 R. C. L., 1093, Art. :109, it is stated: 
"It is the well settled general rule that exemptions from 
taxation are to be strictly construed, and their operation is 
never to be extended by construction. The power and the 
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right of the State to tax are always presumed, and the exemp-
tion must be clearly granted.'' 
Also, in Reta.ilers Credit Association v. Commissioner of 
l'llternal Revenue, 90 Fed. (2) 47, we find the following: 
"It should be noted that a statute creating an exemption 
must be strictly construed, and any doubt must be resolved 
in favor of the taxing power." (Italics supplied.) 
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Peisker v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commissioti, 115 Pac. (2) 62, a case in-
volving an exemption claimed under a section similar to Sec-
tion 2(j)(7)(B) of the Virginia Act relating to instru-
mentalities of the United States, said: 
'~"\Yhile appellant thus seeks to claim benefit through statu-
tory exemption wl1ich he urges applies to him and which he 
claims is found in the act imposing this tax generally upon 
employers., appellees rely upon the general rule applicable to 
claims of exemption under a general taxing act, to the effect 
that the act, including any provision for exemption, is to be 
· strictly construed in favor of the taxin~ authority and against 
the one claiming the exemption. We have adopted this 
rule. "-Citing Ford v. Delta d; Pine Land Company, 164 U.S. 
662, 41 L. Ed. 590; Cooley on Taxation (3rd Ed.) 357, and 
other authorities. 
The principle involved in the issue here lms been decided 
by this Court in the case of Home Beneficial Life fosu,rance 
Company v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 181 
Va. 811, 27 S. E. (2d) 159. The case under consideration 
10• here was 0 decided bv · the Commissioner before this 
Court handed down the opinion in the Home Beneficial 
case. The Commissioner had erred in holding that the in-
dustrial agents of the Appellee in this case were not agents 
and solicitors witl1in t11e meaning of the exclusion amendment 
quoted herein, and tlie trial court was clearly right in reveri;-
ing the Commissioner on that point. In the Home Beneficial 
case the Court found as a fact that once an agent, or debit 
collector, of that Company ever arrived at the point where 
llis debit was $85.00, tl1e agent thereupon ceased to be re-
munerated by a guaranteed minimum, because he was there-
after 011 a straight commission of twenty per cent of the 
collections actually made, although the total of the weekly 
commissions migl1t amount to less than the minimum guaran-
tee. 
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In tbe case now before tbe Court the agents who accepted 
the plan inaugurated l\iay 23., 1940, do not go on a straight 
commission basis after their respective debits liave once 
reached a certain amount as was the situation in the Home 
Beneficial case. Faili1ig to perceive this d·istfoction, the trial 
court erred. The stipulation is free from ambiguity on this 
point. '\Ve quote from the stipulation (R., p. 10) : 
".A. part of th~ agents employed by the Company are 
remunera.ted by being paid a definite percentage on the 
amownts of preniimns collected by them, and turned in by them 
to the Compan,y." (Italics supp'lied.) 
Agents thus remunerated are not in employment under the 
decision of this Court in the Home Beneficial case. Let us 
continue to examine the same paragraph of the stipulation 
(R., p. 10) as it continues as follows: 
"This was the usual way employed by the Company to 
remunerate its agents prior to l\Iay 23, 1940. On that date 
the Company put into effect a plan of remuneration given in 
detail below. All of the agents were invited to accept the 
plan. Most of them did, but some pref erred to continue on 
the old basis of being remunerated by being paid a 
11" definite pet·centage of the amounts of premhtms "'col-
lected by them.'' (Italics ours.) 
The other agents pref erred the plan. If the plan provides 
for a method of remuneration solely by way of commission, 
then why have the plan, since the other agents arc remuner-
ated that way? The answer is obvious. The "p]an" pro-
vides a means of assuring to the agent who accepted it a 
definite minimum wage each week, based on the size of the 
agent's debit. The purpose, of course, is to insure a living 
wage to the agent, rather than to force him to rely f!Olely upon 
his commissions each week. ,vimt is tl1e plan? We will take 
the city worker, since tlrnre is no difference between his plan 
and the rural worker except as to the amount of weekly wage. 
We quote: 
"An agent working in a city receives a remuneration based 
upon his debit as follows: . 
"a. If his debit during any week is· less than $100, he re-
ceives a commission of $20 for such week.'' 
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The trial court held that an agent servicing a debit under 
the above paragraph "a'~ was in employment on the theory, 
we assume,, that such agent was in the same category as the 
agent in the Home Beneficial case servicing a debit of less 
than $85.00. To this extent the trial court was clearly right. 
'' b. If his debit during any week is between $100 and $110, 
he receives a commission of $22.50 for such week.'' 
"c" and "d" read the same, except that the minimum 
guarantee increases in each category. 
Suppose "a" should rend as follows: "If his debit dur-
ing any week is between $25.00 and $100, he receives a com-
mission of $20.00 for such week.'' The result would be the 
same, because the agent's weekly wage would not be de-
12,a. pendent on ea fixed percentage of remuneration, based 
on actual collections made. He would earn and receive 
for I1is efforts fo servicing the debit for one week the sum of 
$20.00. This is not remuneration solely by way of commis-
sion. Under "a" the debit is between the minimum size of 
the debit and $100. Under "b", the debit is between $100 and 
$110. Except in words and figures there is not any diffe1·encc 
between the two categories "a" and "b ", as well as the other 
categories. The meaning is the same; the effect is the same. 
The agent under "b" is paid $22.50 for servicing a debit for 
one week, regardless of whether the debit is $101, or any figure 
between $100 and $110, and regardless of the actual amount 
collected. In ot]1er words, he is under exactly the same form 
of contract regarding remuneration as the agent working un-
der "a". He is paid $22.50 if his debit is between a minimum 
and a maxi1num, and that is precisely 110w the agent under 
''a'' is paid, except he receives $2.50 less. The amount of 
guaranteed pay is the only difference between. the. categories. 
In asking this Court to reverse the trial court we rely on 
the case of Home Beneficial Life lnsurmwe Company v. Un-
employment Compen,sation Commission, supra. The case now 
under consideration was pending in the lower court during 
the pendency of the Home Beneficial case in this Court. It 
was not called for hearing because counsel wished to first 
learn tlie outcome of the Home Beneficial case. This, we as-
sumed, was because of the fact that the same principle was 
involved in both cases. "\Ve think that the effect of the deci-
sion in the Home Beneficial case was to nullif v the decision 
of Commissioner Rhodes in the present case oniy with regard 
to Commissioner Rhodes' holding that debit collectors are not 
agents within the meaning of the statute, and, tlierefore, the 
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earnings of those who elected to stay out of the "plan" do 
not constitute wages under the Act. The earnings of all other 
agents, if we understand the Home Beneficial case, constitute 
wages. 
In llome Beneficial Life Iusurance Company v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commis.~ion, supra, this Court, citing sev-
eral cases, said: 
13° e"While, as we have said, in their dealings the parties 
referred to the guaranteed minimum weekly stipend as a 
'.commission', and it was carried on the records of the Insur- . 
ance Company as such, we arc not bound by this terminology, 
but we must look beyond it to the actual relationship of the 
parties 0 >$ "'.'' 
"'Commissions', when 'used to express compensation for 
services rendered', usually denotes 'a percentage on the 
amount of moneys pnid out or received.' " 
" 'Salary' is generally defined ns 'a fixed annual or period-
ical payment for services, depending upon the time and not 
upon the amount of services rendered.' '' 
'' Tl1e controlling element in determining whether the 
amount to be received is upon a commission or salary basis 
is whether that amount, by whatever name it is called, is 
absolute and fixed regardless of what the lawful commissions 
may be, or is made contingent upon eaming that amount as 
commission. '' 
.Applying- the agreed statement of facts in this case to the 
law as stated above, we cannot see how those agents in cate-
•,.ories "b" "c" mid "d" can be held to be performino- serv-h J 0 
ices in exempt employment within the terms of the exception 
2(j)(7)(N). 
The pavments under catcO'ories "a'' "b'' ''c" and "cl" ~ n ' ' 
are most surely fixed nnd periodical payments for services 
depending solely upon the length of time of the services rather 
than upon the amount of such services. For servicing a debit 
between $90.00 nnd $100 for one week the agent is paid $20.00. 
That is for time-one week's service. For servicing a debit 
between $100 and $110 for one week the agent is paid (in the 
city) $22.50. That, too. is for time:-one week's service. He 
is paid the $22.50 whether he collects one ]mndred per cent 
of his debit or whether he collects anv amount less than one 
hundred per cent or collects none, provided, of course .. he per-
forms service during the week by endeavoring to collect his 
debit. In none of the categories is the pay contingent 
14• upon the results obtained. *The pay in each category 
is contingent upon the size of t11e debit being serviced. 
In the Hom~ B9neficial case after the debit reached $85.00, the 
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situation was different, and, therefore, agents servicing a 
debit of $85.00, were not in employment. On this point the 
Court said: 
"Tested by these principles (alluding to the principles 
quoted above) we think it is clear that the guaranteed weekly 
minimum payment of $15, which was made to Prins prior to 
the time that his weekly debit collections amounted to $85.00, 
was a salary and not a commission. This payment was not 
based on a percentage of the collections made. On the con· 
trary, it was a fixed and periodical remuneration for his serv-
ices., whicl1 depended solely upon the length of time of the 
serdces performed and not upon the amount of such services. 
The guaranteed weekly stipend was not contingent upon the 
results obtained other than that the collections did not ex-
ceed $85." · 
The decision of the trial ~ourt, we respectfully submit, is 
in direct conflict with this Court's opinion handed down in 
the Home Beneficial case, especially with respect to the status 
of the agents performing services in categories "b"~ "c" 
and "d". There is no justification in this record for assum-
ing that tile services of agents in category ''a'' are not ex-
empted under Section 2(j) (7) (N) and the services of agentc; 
in the other categories are exempted. The services of all 
the agents who accepted the "plan" arc under covered em-
ployment or the services of all such agents are out of covered 
employment. The meaning of the contract with respect to 
each category is exactly the same. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of ·w ashington 
Nati01ial Insurance Company v. Emvloyment Security Com-
mission, 144 Pacific (2d) 688, handed down a decision on Jan-
uary 4, 1944, involving the identical stat~te.as the one under 
consideration here. The Arizona Court cited with approval 
the Home Beneficial case. ·while the terms of the contract in 
the Arizona case diff cr to some extent from the terms of the 
Union Life Insurance contract and the Home Beneficial con-
tract, the principle involved is tlie same and the conclu-
15t) sion of that court was in accord with the judgment @of 
tl1is Court in the Home Beneficial case. That Court, re-
versing the lower Court, held tlmt debit collectors were agents 
and solicitors, agreeing with the Supreme Court of Virginia; 
that industrial agents who were paid each week an amount 
equal to a certain percentage of the total premiums collected 
plus a percentage of the net increase in their debits were in 
excluded employment inasmuch as they performed services 
for remuneration solely by way of commission ;.that industrial 
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agents who were paid a minimum of $35.00 upon the basis of 
a formula which would theoretically build up a reserve in 
commissions equal to an average of $35.00 per week, were not 
in excluded employment. The Arizona Court held that the 
payment of unvarying sums each week, without respect to the 
amount of insurance sold, was not remuneration solely by 
way of commission. 
"\\7 e think it may be asserted that, under the principles of 
law laid down by this Court and the Arizona Court, remunera-
tion solely by way of commission can never be in unvarying 
sums unless the commissions have already been earnea and 
the payment thereof is divided into equal payments over a 
fixed period of time transpiring subsequent to the period of 
time during which the commissions were actually earned and 
the amount definitely and accurately determined. The Union 
Life Insurance Company can find no facts in the stipulation 
to support a claim that the agents in categories "b'', "c'\ 
and '' d'' are being paid a sum each week based on commis-
sions previously earned. The agents each week arc paid a 
fixed, unvarying sum for the services performed during that 
week, regardless of the amount of the services, and without 
any obligation or agreement on the part of the _agent to ad-
just the remuneration at any' time on a strictly commission 
basis. 
PRAYER. 
For tbe reasons set forth l1erein, your petitioner is advised 
and believes that the Chancery Court of the City of Rich-
mond erred to the prejudice of your petitioner in its decree 
holding that the agents who service debits of $100 or 
168 more 9 are not in employment under tl1e Act .. ,vhere-
fore, your petitioner pravs that an appeal be granted it 
from the final decree aforesaid; that this Court review and 
reverse said decree to the extent that it is erroneous and in 
conflict with the decision of this Court handed down in the 
recent case of llome Beneficial Life lnsura-nce Compan11 v. U·n-
employment Conipensatimi Commission, supra, and that this 
Court correct the erroneous decree of the trial court and enter 
such decree as the trial court should have entered. 
A copy of this petition, which, with the record, was de-
livered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals at 
Richmond on .July 26th. 1944, was mailed on the same date 
of Elsworth "Wiltshire, Esquire., and Oscar L. Shewmnke, Es-
quire, Counsel for tl1e Appellee, in accordance with Rule 9(4). 
Petitioner adopts this petition as its opening brief, and 
14 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
desires. to state orally the reasons for reviewihg t11e decision 
complained of. 
Respectfully submitted, 
tJNEl\IPLOYM:mNT COMPENSATION COM~ 
MISSION OF VI~GINIA, 
Petitidner, 
By KENNETH C. PATTY,. 
ABRAM P. STAPLES, . 
Attorrtey General of Virginia, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Of Counsel. 
KENNETtl C. PATTY, . 
Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
17" ~1, Kenneth C. Patty, Attorney at Law, practicing in 
tlie Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgi11ia, do certify 
that in my opinion it is proper. that the final decree ~nd de-
cision complained of in the foregoing petition should be re-
yiewed by this Court. 
Received July 26, 1944. 
Appeal allowed. 
Aug. 14, 1944. 
Received August 15, 1944. 
KENNETH C. PATTY. 
l\I. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
JOHN W. E!GGLESTON. 
:M:. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Judge of the Chancery Court of the City 
of Richmond, the 5th day of June, 1944. 
BE IT REl\IEl\f.BERED, that 11eretofore, to-wit: on the 
2nd day of December, 1942, came the petitioner, The Union 
Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, a Virginia corpora-
tion, and by leave of Court filed its petition against the de-
fendant, Unemployment Compensation Commission of Vir-
ginia, which petition is in the following words and figures, 
to-wit: 
PETITION. 
I 
The ·Union Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, a Vir-
ginia corporation, 
v. 
Unemployment Compensation Commission of Virginia. 
To the Honorable .Judge of said Court: 
Your Petitioner, The Union Life Insurance Company, In-
corporated, respectfully represents as follows: 
1. It is a corporation organized and now existing under· 
the laws of the State of Virginia witl1 its principal office in 
the City of Ricl1mond, Vir!!.'inia. 
2. On l\Iay 25, 1942, the Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission of Virginia (herein called "Commission") notified 
~·our Petitioner in writin~ that for the purpose of determin-
ing the status under the Virginia Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act, herein called ''Act", (Sections 2(j)(6) and 
page 2 ~ 2(j) (7) (N) and any other appropriate Sections or 
sub-sections) of all industrial insurance agents of 
your Petitioner who have been engaged in the performance 
of the operations of your Petitioner Rt any time since De-
cember 31, 1939, the Commission had directed that a henring 
be held under Section 7 (a) of the said Act before the Com-
mission on .Tune 23. 1942. nt 10 A. :u. in Room 320, Broad-
Grace Arcade Building, Richmond, Virginin. 
3. Tl1ereafter the facts pertinent to the matters involved 
in the said notice were agreed upon and embodied in a Stipu-
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lation of Facts (herein called "Stipulation") entered into 
between the Assistant Attorney. General of Virginia repre-
senting the Commission and counsel for your Petitioner and 
filed with the Commission, and·no testimony whatsoever was 
taken before the Commission as to the issues involved. 
4. After a hearing· had been held, the Commission on No-
vember 5, 1942, made its Findings of Fact and decision, the 
decision being as follows: 
"Based upon the findings of fact I1erein and the conclusions 
of law, it is the judgment of the Commission that the indi-
viduals engaged by the Union Life Insurance Company, a 
corporation, and designated as agents in the stipulation :filed 
he1·ein, are not performing all of their services for said Com-
pany as insurance agents and as insurance solicitors, and 
that said individuals who accepted the plan of compensation 
put into effect on l\Iay 23, 1940, are not remunerated solely 
by way of commission. Accordingly, the Union Life Insur-
ance Company is directed to forthwith file with the Commis-
sion wage reports showing all the earnings up to $3,000 in 
any one calendar year with respect to each individual in ~ts 
employment after December 31, 1939, and des1g-
page 3 ~ nated in the stipulation filed l1erein as agents, and 
to pay the contributions assessable against it on ac-
count thereof, and in every respect comply with all the laws, 
rules and regulations of tl1e Commission pertaining to em-
ploying units adjudged and determined to be employers under 
the Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act." 
5. Your Petitioner is aggrieved by the decision aforesaid, 
seeks a review thereof before this Court, and sets forth the 
following grounds upon which such review is sought: 
(a) The Commission erred in holding that all of those 
designated in the Stipulation as "agents" of your Petitioner 
were not performing service for your Petitioner as "insur-
ance agents'' or as ''insurance solicitors". The Commission 
should have held that each of these ''agents'' of your Peti-
tioner mentioned in the Stipulation was an ''insurance 
agent" or an '"insurance solicitor", so that his service per-
formed for your Petitioner was within Section 2(j) (7) (n) of 
the Act if such service was performed for. remuneration solely 
by way of commission. 
(b) The Commission erred in holding that all of those 
designated in the Stipulation as ''agents'' of your Petitioner 
who accepted the plan of your Petitioner put into effect on 
May 23, 1940, were not remunerated solely by way of com-
' I 
I 
I 
I 
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mission. The Commission should have held that all of such 
.agents were remunerated solely by way of commission . 
. ( c) The Commission erred in not holding that all of those 
designated in the Stipulation as "agents" of your Petitioner 
were "insurance ao·ents" or ''insurance solicitors" that all ~ , 
·services performed by them for your Petitioner were p~r-
formed for remuneration solely by way of comm1s-
page 4} sion., and that accordingly the term "employment" 
as used in the Act did not include their services. 
{d) The Commission erred in directing your Petitioner 
to forthwith file with the Commission wage reports showing 
the earnings up to $3,000 of the said ''agents'' of your Peti-
tioner and to pay the contributions assessable against your 
Petitioner on account of such wage reports. 
"WHEREFORE your Petitioner prays that the decision of 
the Commission above mentioned be reviewed by this Court 
in accordance with the terms of Section 7(a) of the Act as 
amended by the Acts of 1942, that the said decision be re-
versed and set aside, and that this Court adjudge that the 
services performed by all of those designated in the Stipula-
tion as "agents" of your Petitioner were performed as "in-
surance agents'' or '' insurance solicitors'' for remuneration 
solely by way of commission, and that accordingly the term 
"employment" as used in the Act .does not include these 
:services. 
THE UNION LIFE INSURANCE COM-
PANY, INCORPORATED, 
By ELLSWORTH WILTSHffiE 
OSCAR L. SHEWMAKE, 
Counsel. 
November 30, 1942. 
Legal and timely service of two copies of the foregoing 
petition is hereby accepted on this December 1st, 1942. 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COM-
~IISSION OF VIRGINIA 
By KENNETH C. PATTY, 
Asst. Atty. General, 
Counsel for said Commission. 
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page 5 } ORDER 0~, DECEMBER 2, 1942. 
This day came The Union Life Insurance Company, I1~-
corporated, by counsel and presented its petition for revie,v 
of an order entered against it by the Unemployment Compen-
sation Commission of Virginia on November 5, 1942, in a pro-
ceeding under Section 7 (a) of the Virginia Unemployment 
Compensation Act as amendetl, which petition bears the en-
dorsement that legal and timely service of two copies thereof 
has been accepted by the said Commission acting through 
Kenneth C. Patty, Assistant Attorney General. 
And on motion of the petitioner by counsel and with the 
consent of the said Commission by the said Assistant Attor-
ney General, the petition is ordered filed. 
ANSWER OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA, FILED IN COURT 
UNDER DECREE OF JANUARY 11, 1943. 
The answer of Unemployment Compensation Commission 
of Virginia to a petition filed by The Union Life Insurance 
Company, Incorporated, in the Chancery Court of the City of 
Richmond against this respondent. 
Respondent, reserving unto itself the henefit of all just ex-
ceptions to said petition, for answer tl1ereto, or to so much 
· thereof as it is advised it is material it should answe1·, answers 
and says: · 
That respondent is an instrumentality of the Common-
wealth of' Vfrginia, created by the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia by an Act approved December 18, 1936, and thereafter 
from time to time amended, known as ''Virginia Un-
page 6 } employment Compensation Act.'' 
That the allegations contained and set forth in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said petition arc admitted to be 
true. 
That the allegations contained and set forth in paragraph 5 
are whollv denied. 
As required by law, respondent files herewith all documents 
and papers contained in the record of the proceedings liad 
before the Commission~ together with its findings of fact and 
decision therein, duly certified and made a part of this answer, 
tnarked ''Exhibit U. C. C. No. 1 ". 
Respondent, further answering, avers that under said Sec-
tion 7 (a) '' the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if 
supported by the evidence and in the absence of fraud'' are 
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conclusive and that the jtirisdi~tion of t_his Court is confined 
to questions of la,v. The finding.s of fact are amply su_ppor_ted 
by the evidence found in the 1'Stiptilatioi1' 1 filed with 11 Ex.:. 
hibit No. l". No fraud has been alleged by the petitiorter, 
and; th~i·efore, respondent avet·s that the flrldings of fhct are 
conclusive as between tJetitioiier and this i·espondent. 
Respondent fur~her avers that the conclusions of respond'." 
ent on all questions of law arising in the matter arc correct 
and unassailable. 
Respondent deities each and every allegation of the peti;;. 
tion not hereinbcfore admitted or denied. 
And now, having fully answefod petitiort_er 's petitiott, re-
spondent p1·ays that said petition for review be dismissed, and 
. that respondent be l1ence dismissed with its reason-" 
page 7 } able costs in in, this behalf expended. 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA'rION COM-
MISSION OF VIRGINIA. 
By KENNETH C. PATTY, Counset 
KENNETH C. PATTY, 
Assistant Att~rney Gener~l of Virginia, 
and as such, Counsel for Unemployment 
Compensation Commission of Virginia. 
EXHIBIT U. C. C. NO. 1, FILED IN COURT UNDER 
DECREE OF JANUARY 11, I943. 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION OF 
VIRGINIA. 
In the Matter of: 
The·Stah:ts of Industrial Insurance Agents of Union Life In-
surance Company, a corporation. 
DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 7(a) OF THE ACT. 
NOTICE OF HEARING. 
To: Union Life insurance Company, 
a corporation, · 
15 N. Sixth Street, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
You ate hereby hotified that for the purpose of detetniining 
the status under the Unemployment Compen'sation Act of 
Virginia (Sections 2(j) (6) and 2(j) (7) (N) and any other ap-
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propriate Sections or sub-sections) of all industrial insurance 
agents of Union Life Insurance Company, a Corporation,. 
who have been engaged in the performance of the· operations 
of said corporation at any time since December 31, 1939~ the 
Unemployment Compensation Commission of Virginia has di-
rected that a hearing be held under Section 7(a) of the Act 
before said Commission on June 23, 1942, at 10 :00 
page 8 ~ o'clock A. M., in Room 320, Broad-Grace Arcade 
Building, Ricl1mond, Virginia. If said hearing is 
not concluded on that day it will be continued from time to 
time until said hearing is concluded. 
Union Life Insurance Company, a Corporation, is directed 
to produce at said hearing copies of all forms and types of 
agents' contracts or agreements in use as of January 1, 1940, 
and at all times subsequent thereto; a list of all agents who 
have performed any service for said corporation within the 
State of Virginia since December 31, 1939, and who are 
deemed by said corporation to be in exempt employment by 
reason of the provisions of Section 2(j){7)(N) of the Act; 
and to be prepared to furnisl1 any evidence essential and 
relevant to a determination of the status of said agents under 
the provisions of said Section 2(j) (7) (N) of said Act. 
Given under my band this 25th day of May, 1942 . 
May 25, 1942. 
• JNO~ Q. RHODES, JR., 
Commissioner. 
A copy of this has today been mailed to E. ·wntshire, At-
torney, and Union Life Ins. Co. 
MARY K. CHAISA 
l\fay 26, 1942. 
Virginia: 
IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMl\fIS-· 
SION OF. VIRGINIA. 
In the Matter of 
The status of Industrial Insurance Agents of The Union 
Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, a Virginia Corpo-
ration. 
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· DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION (7a) OF VIR-
GINIA UNEMPLOY.i\IENT COMPENSATION ACT. 
It is stipulated between counsel for The Union Life Insur-
ance Company, Incorporated, a Virginia corpora-
page 9 } tion, and tl1e Attorney General of Virginia as coun-
sel for the Unemployment Compensation Commis-
·sion of Virginia, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth pf 
Virginia, tliat only the following facts shall be considered in 
making this determination : 
The Union Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, {herein 
called "Company") is a corporation organized and now ex-
isting under the laws of the State of Virginia with its prin-
cipal office in the City of Richmond, Virginia. It is engaged 
in writing industrial life and industrial sick benefit insurance 
in the State of Virginia and not elsewhere. 
Up to January 1, 1940, the Company conceded that an its 
agents were in employment in Virginia within tl1e meaning 
of that term as used in tlie Virginia Unemployment Compen-
sation Act prior to tlle amendment to that Act set forth in 
Section 2{j) {7) (N) and paid when due all unemployment 
taxes upon an of its employees pursuant to the Federal and 
Virginia Unemployment Compensation Acts. On January 
1, 1940, the amendment to the Virginia Act found in Section 
2(j)(7)(N) became operative, whicl1 provided tlmt "the term 
'employment' after December 31, 1939, shall not include: 
~ >!) • (n) Service performed by an individual for an em-
ploying unit as an insurance agent or as an insurance solicitor, 
if all such service performed by such individual for such em-
ploying unit is performed for remuneration solely by wav of 
commission ; 0 0 «'. • 
"Thereafter the Company continued to pnv the un-
employment tax with respect to remuneration paid bv it 
to its officers, its office employees, and its managers ·and 
assistant managers, as their remuneration was at a fixed 
salary.basis. However, the Company did not pay any unem-· 
ployment tax after January 1, 1940, upon remuner-
page 10} ation received by its agents, as the Company took 
the position that tliese. agents were subject to the 
amendment above quoted and that accordingly the term "em-
ployment" as defined in said Act was not applicable to the 
services performed by them. It is admitted, however, by the 
Company that in the absence of the foregoing amendment the 
services of sucl1 agents would be included witl1in the term 
"employment" as defined in said Act and that the issue here 
11 Supreme Court of' .Appears of Vfrl!inia: 
is whether because of the foregoing amendment the term: 
"employment" as defined in said Act has since January 1, 
1940, included the services of such agents, no material chang~ 
having occurred in the nature of the services being per-
formed by such agents. 
A. part of the agents employed by the Company are remu-
nerated by being paid a definite percentage on the amounts 
of premiums collected by them and turned in by them to the-
Company. Tl1is was the usual way employed by the Com-
pany to remunerate its agents prior to May 23, 1940. On t~at. 
date the Company put into effect a plan of remuneration 
given in detail below. All of the agents were invited to ac-
cept the plan. Most of them did, but some pref el'red to con-
tinue on the old basis of being remunerate~ by being paid a 
definite percentage of the amounts of premmms collected by 
them. The facts set forth herein from this point relate to the: 
duties of all agents and to the method of remuneration of 
those agents who elected to accept the plan of remuneration 
inaugurated on May 23~ 1940. 
The plan inaugurated on 1\{ay 23, 1940, is as follows: 
Each agent of the Company upon being em-
page_ 11 } ployed as such is given a list of policies then in 
force with the Company which provide for weekly 
premiums ranging upwards from 5 cents depending upon the-
age of tl1e insured, the kind of insurance provided in tbe 
policy, and the face amount of the policy. The total amount 
of premiums collectible on tl1ese policies in snch list is called 
the weekly "debit", and eacl1 agent has accordingly a weekly 
debit which he is to service. His duties are to collect and ac-
count for his weekly debit, to cause policies on his debit which 
are in arrears past the grace period to be lapsed by the Com-
pany, to solicit and obtain applications for new policies and 
submit such applications to the Company for approval and 
issuance, and to deliver new policies to the respective insureds 
upon issuance. 
The debit of the agent changes from week to week as the 
result of the agent's activities. Some policies will lapse 
through non-payment of premiu~ and this will decrease the 
size of his debit. New policies written by him will increase the 
size of his debit. A "weekly premium net increase'' results 
in an agent's debit if the total of the weekly premiums on new 
policies added to his debit during the week exceeds the total 
of the weekly premiums on policies removed from bis debit 
during the week through lapse. Thus, an agent may start the 
week of June 1, with a. debit of $112. This means that the 
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total amount of weekly premiums on the list of policies allo-
cated to him for servicing equals $112. If he collects $112 
during that week, he will have collected 100% of his debit. 
However, during that week the Company may on policy ap-
plications theretofore received by this agent issue fifteen new 
policies each with a 25 cent weekly premium. These policies 
will be added to this ngent 's debit, so that the size 
page 12 } of his debit will rise to $115.75. However, because 
of failure to pay premiums past the grace period, 
ten policies on this agent's debit each with a 25 cent weekly 
premium may be lapsed during the week in question. This 
will reduce this agent's debit by $2.50, so that his debit for 
that week will be $113.25. As this debit at the commencement 
of the week was $112, the "weekly premium net increase'' on 
his debit during the week was $1.25. . 
It is understood between each agent and the Company that 
the agent must collect at least an average of 95% of his weekly 
debit durin~ each week and that his failure so to do, unless 
occasioned through sickness or other satisfactory reason, will 
result in the termination of his relationship with the Com-
pany. Indeed, the agents of the Company during the years 
1940 and 1941 and the first five months of 1942 have averaged 
collecting 97.24 per cent of their respective debits. 
The remuneration received by each agent for the perform-
ance of his duties as above set out is based upon his debit in 
the manner set forth below. 
An agent working in a city receives remuneration based 
upon his debit as follows: . 
a. If his debit during any week is less than $100 he receives 
a commission of $20 for such week. 
b. If his debit during anv week is between $100 and $110, 
lie receives n commission or' $22.50 for such week. 
c. If his debit during nny week is between $110 and $120, he 
receives a commission of $23.50 for such week. 
page 13 } d. If his debit during any week is over $120~ he 
receives a commission of $23.50 plus $1 for each 
$10 of debit in excess of $120. 
An ngent working in the country receives remuneration 
based upon his debit as follows: 
a. If his debit during any week is less than $100 he receives 
a commission of $22.50 for such week. 
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b. If his debit during any week is between $100 and $110,, 
he receives a commission of $27.50 for such week. 
c. If his debit during any week is between $110 and $1~0, 
he receives a commission of $28.50 for such week. 
d. If his debit during any week is over $120, he receives a 
commission of $28.50. plus $1 for each $10 of debit in excess 
of $120. 
Where the term '' receives a commission'' is used in the 
various paragraphs numbered (a) through ( d), it is not meant 
to imply that the Attorney General admits that the agents 
are remunerated "solely by way of commission" within tbe 
meaning of that term as used in Section 2(j) (7) (N) of the 
Act. 
As. further special remuneration under the plan inaugu-
rated on l\Iay 23, 1940, whenever an agent has a "weekly 
premium net increase" during any week, he receives as special 
remuneration for that week a sum equal to 15 times on one-
half of such ",veekly premium net increase", but such special 
remuneration for such week shall not exceed $10. One-half 
of such "weekly premium net increase" for such week is 
then placed in a reserve account. ·whenever the agent has 
accumulated more than $10 in such reserve ac-
page 14 ~ count, he may be paid as additional remuneration 
15 times on up to $1 out of such reserve account 
each week wbetl1er he during such week makes any "weekly 
premium net increase" or not, so long as he still maintains 
at least $10 in such reserve account. Thus, if the agent has a 
"weekly premium net increase" of $1 for a given week, he 
receives special remuneration for such week of 15 . times 50 
cents or $7.50. One-half of this "weekly premium net in-
crease" then goes into the said "reserve account". This pro-
cedure continues from week to week. Suppose by virtue of 
these increases the reserve account of the agent has now 
reached $12. The next week he can draw above his other 
remuneration a sum equal to 15 times $1 or $15. This of 
course reduces the said reserve account by $1 down to $11. 
He can do the same the next week, even tl1ough he has no 
''weekly premium net increase" for that week, for he still 
has $1 over the required $10 in l1is reserve account and is ac-
cordingly entitled to receive 15 times such $1 or $15. But 
this reduces the reserve account down to $10, so that he can 
draw no further remuneration bv virtue of the reserve ac-
count until he has increased the· reserve account above $10 
through his later ''weekly premium net increases" as above 
set out. 
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All persons hereinabove called agents are and have ever 
:since the commencement of their employment by the Com-
:pany been licensed as "agents" by the State Corporation 
Commission under the laws of the State of Virginia pursuant 
to Section 4235 of the Code of Virginia as amended. 
page 15 } Virginia : 
ELLSWORTH WILTSHIRE 
OSCAR L. SHE,VMAKE 
Counsel for The Union Life In-
surance Company, Incorporated. 
KENNETH C. PATTY, 
Assistant Attorney General. 
IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMIS-
SION. 
In the l\'Iatter of 
lJnion Life Insurance Company, a corporation. 
J.>ROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 7(a) OF THE VIR-
GINIA UNEl\fPLOYl\IENT COMPENSATION ACT. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
This is a proceeding under Section 7 (a) of the Virginia 
Unemployment Compensation Act to determine the status un-
der said act of the individuals in the service of the Union 
Life Insurance Company (hereinafter called Company) as 
debit collectors and industrial agents. 
The evidence consists solely of a stipulation of facts en-
tered into between counsel for the Company and the Assistant 
Attorney General representing this Commission and filed with 
the Commissioner. 
Summarizing the stipulation, it appears that the Company 
is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia with its principal office in the City 
of Ricl1mond, Virginia, and is engaged in writing industrial 
1if e and industrial sick benefit insurance in Virginia and not 
elsewhere. 
The Company conceded that all its agents were in employ-
ment in Virginia within the meaning of that term as used in 
the Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act prior to Jan-
uary 1st, 1940. Since January 1st, 1940i the effective date 
of the amendment to the Virginia Unemp oyment Compensa-
tion Act known as Section 2(j)(7)(N), the Company has 
... , .. (,\ 
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taken the position that its agents are not in employment, con-
tending that such agents come within the exception 
2(j) (7) (N), which reads as follows~ 
page 16 } "The term 'employment', after December thirty-
first, nineteen hundred and thirty-nine, shall not. 
include! 
Service performed by an individual for an employing unit. 
as an insm·ance agent or as an insurance solicitor, if all such 
service performed by such individual for such employing unit 
is p~rf ormed for remuneration solely by way of commis-
sion.'' · 
The Company concedes that in the absence of tllc foregoing 
amendment the services of such agents would be employment 
under the act subsequent to January 1st, 1940; and that "the-
issue here is whether because of the foregoing amendment 
the term 'employment' as defined in said act has since Janu-
ary 1, 1940, included the services of such agents, no material 
change having occurred in the natu{·e of the services being 
pe1·formed by such agents.'' 
Prior to May 23, 1940, the usual way employed by the Com:. 
pany to remunerate its agents was by paying them a "definite 
percentage on the amounts of premiums collected by them and 
turned in by them to tl1e Company.'' On May 23, 1940, tl1c 
Company put into effect the plan of remuneration set forth 
in paragraphs (a) through (d) in the stipulation hereinafter 
quoted in full. All tl1e agents were invited to accept the plan, 
and most of them did, but some preferred to continue on the 
old basis of being remunerated. 
Each agent of the Company, regardless of the plan of re-
muneration, upon being employed by the Company is given 
a list of policies which provides for weekly premiums rang-
ing upwards from five cents depending upon the age of the 
insure~ the kind of insurance provided· in the 
page 17 ~ policy, and the face amount of the policy. This 
list is called a weekly "debit'' which each agent is 
required to service. His duties, as stated in the stipulatio~ 
"are to collect and account for his weekly debit, to cause 
policies on his debit which are in arrears past the grace period 
to be lapsed by the Company, to solicit and obtain applications 
for new policies and submit such applications to the Company 
for approval and issuance, and to deliver new policies to the 
respective insured upon issuance." 
Debits may possibly vary in size from week to week, depend-
ing on lapses and new policies. 
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It is understood between each agent and tlie Company that 
at least an average of 95% of the agent's weekly debit must 
be collected during each week and that his failur~ so to do, 
unless caused by sickness or other satisfactory reason, will 
result in release of tl10 agent from the service of the Com-
pany. The agents during the years 1940, 1941 and the first 
five months of 1942 have averaged collecting 97.24 per cent-
of their respective debits. 
,vith respect to the remuneration received by each agent, 
the stipulation sets forth the following: 
"The remuneration received by each agent for the per-
formance of his duties as above set out is based upon his ' 
debit in the manner set forth below. 
An agent working· in n city receives remuneration based 
upon his debit as follows: · 
a. If his debit during any week is less than $100, 110 re-
ceives a commission of $20 f Qr such week. 
page 18} b. If his debit during any week is between $100 
and $110, he receives a commission of $22.50 for 
such week. 
c. If his debit during any week is between $110 and $120, 
he receives a commission of $23.50 for such week. 
d. If his debit during any week is over $120., he receives 
a commission of $23.50 plus $1 for each $10 of debit in excess 
of $120. 
An agent working in the country receives remuneration 
based upon his debit as follows: 
a. If his debit during any week is less than $100, he receives 
a commission of $22.50 for sucl1 week. 
b. If his debit during any week is between $100 and $110, 
l1e receives a commission of $27.50 for such week. 
c. If his debit during any week is between $110 and $120, 
he receives a commission of $28.50 for such week. 
d. If Jiis debit during any wC'ek is over $120, he receives· a 
commission of $28.50 plus $1 for each $10 of debit in excess of 
$120.'' 
A further paragraph in the stipulation relating to remu-
neration is as follows: 
"As further special remuneration under the plan inaugu-
rated on May 23, 1940, whenever an agent has a 'weekly 
premium net increase' during any week, he receives as special 
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remuneration for that week a sum equal to 15 times on one-
half of such 'weekly premium net increase', but such special 
remuneration for such week shall not exceed $10. 
page 19 ~ One-half of such weekly premium net increase for 
such week is then placed in a reserve account. 
·whenever the agent has accumulated more than $10 in such 
reserve account, he may be paid as additional remuneration 
15 times on up to $1 out of such reserve account each week 
whether he during such week makes any 'weekly premium net 
increase' or not, so long as he still maintains at least $10 in 
such· reserve account. Thus, if the agent has a 'weekly 
premium net increase' of $1 for a given week, he receives 
special remuneration for such week of 15 times 50 cents or 
$7.50. One-half of this 'weekly premium net inc1·ease' then 
goes into the said 'reserve account'. This procedure con-
tinues from week to week. Suppose by vh-tue of these in-
creases the reserve account of the agent has now reached $12. 
The next week he can draw above his other remuneration a 
sum equal to 15 times $1 or $15. This of course 1·educes the 
said reserve account by $1 down to $11. He can do the same 
the next week, even though he has no 'weekly premium net 
increase' for that week, for he still bas $1 over the required 
$10 iu his reserve account and is accordingly entitled to re-
ceive 15 times such $1 or $15. But this reduces the reserve 
account down to $10., so that he can draw no further remunera-
tion by virtue of the reserve account until he bas increased 
the reserve account above $10 through his later 'weekly pre-
mium net increases' as above set out." 
All persons called agents in t}1e stipulation are licensed as 
"agents" by the State Corporation Commission of Virginia. 
page 20 ~ FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Based on the evidence as outlined above, the Commission 
finds the following facts are established: 
1. The individuals designated as agents perform two gen-
eral types of service fo1· the Company, namely, the collection 
of debits and the solicitation of applications for new policies, 
ancl, tl1erefore, not all of the service performed by each snch 
individual for said Company is performed as an insurance 
agent or insurance solicitor. 
2. Each agent who accepted the plan put into effect :Mav 23, 
1940, is remunerated by the payment of a guaranteed fixed 
amount for each week of service for the Company, based upon 
the size of the debit in his hands for collection, plus a com-
mission on new policies sold and accepted by the Company, 
Unemp1oyment Comp. Comm. of Va. v. Union L. Ins. Co. 29 
;and is not remunerated solely by way of commission. All 
,other agents are remunerated solely by ,vay of commission on 
the amount of collections made and new policies sold and 
-delivered 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA '\V. 
It is conceded by the Company that all the individuals 
-designated by it as agents are in "employment" as that term 
is used in the Act unless tl1ey come within the exception 
2(j) (7) (N) of the Act hereinbefore quoted. 
The burden is upon the Company to show that the indi-
viduals designated by it as agents come within the foregoing 
exception-Life wnd Casimlty Insurance Com,pany v. Uneni-
1Jloyment Cmn.pensation Commission, 178 Va. 54, 16 S. E. (2) 
'360. That burden the Company lias failed to carry in two 
instances, as follows: 
page 21 } 1. It has failed to s11ow that all the services of 
such individuals are performed as an insurance 
agent or as au insurance solicitor. 
2. That the remuneration of such individuals who accepted 
t~e plan of May 23., 1940, is paid solely by w~y of commis-
s10n. 
The facts in this case are similar to tho facts in the recent 
case in which one J olm \\7• Prins was a claimant for unem-
ployment benefits and Home Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany was the employe1·, which case came before the Commis-
·sion on appeal under Section 6(e) of the Act. That case in-
volved the status of industrial life insurance agents under 
the exception contained in Section 2{j) (7) (N) of the Act. 
The Commissioner held in that case that Prins and the other 
agents of the same grade or class were not performing all 
their services as insurance agents or as insurance solicitors as 
contemplated by the statute, and that they were not remu-
nerated solely by way of commission. The Commissioner 
feels bound by that decision and, since there is no material 
difference in the facts in that case and the case under con-
sideration now, must hold the same here. The Commissioner 
is of the opinion, and so holds, that service performed as a 
debit collector is not service performed as an insurance agent. 
An agent is not a servp.nt; a debit collector is a servant. I 
am of the opinion that individuals who perform their entire 
service for an insurance company as an insurance agent or 
as an insurance solicitor are the onlv class meant to be ex-
empted under the exception and then· only provided they are 
remunerated solely by way of commission. 
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W.ith respect to the method of remunerationr 
page 22 ~ even if the Company had shown that its employees 
are insurance agents within the meaning of t11e 
statute, the stipulation of facts, it would seem, leaves no room 
for doubt on this point. As stated in tlle decision in the Home 
Beneficial Life Insurance Company case, '' the phrase 'solely 
by way of commission' as used in tl1e above statute means the 
remuneration payable upon a fixed percentage basis for the: 
performance of services covered by the contract without any 
guarantee·respecting minimum remuneration for any week or 
other period of service during which the prescribed per-
centage basis alone does not yield such minimum." 
The collectors in this case, with the exception of those who 
did not accept the plan put into effect on May 23, 1940, are 
guaranteed and paid a minimum compensation each week not 
as a percentage on actual collections but for handling a debit 
of a stipulated size. Such method of remuneration does not. 
come within the foregoing definition. 
DECISION. 
Based upon the findings of fact herein and the conclusions 
of law, it is the judgment of the Commission that the indi-
viduals engaged by the Union Life Insurance Company, a 
corporation, and designated as agents in the stipulation filed 
herein, are not performing all their services for said Com-
pany as insurance agents and as insurance solicitors, and that 
said individuals who accepted the plan of compensation put 
into effect on May 23, 1940, are not remunerated solely by 
way of commission. Accordingly, the Union Life Insurance 
Company is directed to forthwith file with the Commission 
wage reports showing all the earnings up to $3,000 
page 23 ~ in any one calendar year with respect to each in-
dividual in its employment after December 31, 
1939., and designated in the stipulation filed herein as agents, 
and to pay the contributions assessable against it on account 
thereof, and in every respect comply with all the laws, rules 
and regulations of the Commission pertaining to employing 
units adjudged and determined to be employers under the 
Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act. 
This order is entered on this, the 5 day of November, 1942. 
JNO. Q. RHODES, JR., 
Commissioner. 
Copies mailed to Hon. Oscar L. Shewmake and Mr. Ells-
worth Wiltshire on Nov. 5, 1942. 
l\L K. C. 
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ORDER OF JANUARY 11, 1943. 
The respondent, Unemployment Compensation Commission 
<>f Virginia, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, by the Attorney General, reserving unto itself all just 
exceptions to the petition .filed against it in this cause, th.is 
day appeared and tendered its answer to said petition, to-
gether with its "Exhibit U. C. C. No. 1" containing all docu-
ments and papers., including the stipulation of facts agreed 
upon between counsel for the petitioner and this respondent, 
before this respondent and a]so containing its findings of fact 
a:hd decision thereon, and asked leave to file the same, whicb 
leave of court is hereby granted, and the said answer and Ex-
hibit are accordingly ordered filed. 
page 24 ~ AMENDED PETITION, FILED IN COURT UN-
DER DECREE OF :MAY 17, 1944. 
Yoqr petitioner, The Union Life Insurance Company, In-
corporated, respectfully represents as follows: 
· A. On December 2, 1942, it filed in this Court its petition 
for the· review by this Court of the de~ision of the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission of Virginia (herein called 
''Commission") therein mentioned. 
B. Your Petitioner as and for an amendment to the said 
petition sets forth the following as additional grounds upon 
which review of the said decision is sought, said grounds to 
be inserted in paragraph 5 of said petition immediately ahead 
of subparagraph (a) of said paragraph 5; 
(i) TJ10 Commission erred finding as a fact that not all of 
the services performed by each individual designated as the 
Company's agent in the Stipulation is performed as an insur-
ance agent or insurnnce solicitor. It should have found as a 
conclusion of law that all of tlie services performed by each 
individual designated as the Company's agent for the Com-
pany was performed as an insurance agent or insurance 
solicitor. 
(ii) The Commission erred in finding as a fact that each 
agent who accepted the plan put into effect May 23, 1940, is 
remunerated by the payment of a guaranteed fixed amount 
for cael1 week of service for the Company based upon the 
size of the debit in llis hands for collection plus a commission 
on new policies sold and accepted by the Company and is not 
32 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
remunerated solely by way of commission. It 
page 25 ~ should have found as a conclusion of law that each 
such agent is remunerated solely by way of com-
mission. 
C. The said petition amended as provided in paragraph B 
above is he1·e adopted by your Petitioner as its amended peti-
tion herein. 
THE UNION LIFE INSURANCE COM-
PANY~ INCORPORATED, 
By ELLSWORTH "WILTSHIRE 
OSCAR L. SHEWMAKE, 
Counsel. 
ORDER OF MAY 17, 1944. 
This day came 1.'he Union Life Insurance Companyf Incor-
porated, by counsel and presented its amended petition herein, 
which petition is with the consent of the respondent, Unem-
ployment Compensation Commission of Virginia, ordered 
filed. 
ANS'\VER TO AMENDED PETITION. 
The answer of Unemployment Compensation Commission 
of Virginia to an amended petition filed by the Union Life 
Insurance Company, Incorporated, in the Chancery Court of 
the City of Richmond against this respondent. 
For answer thereto, respondent denies all the allegations 
contained in said amended petition, and prays that 
page 26 ~ said amended petition be hence dismissed with re-
spondent's reasonable costs in this behalf ex-
pended. 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COM-
:MISSION OF VIRGINIA 
By KENNETH C. PATTY, Counsel. 
ORDER OF MAY 17, 1944. 
The respondent, Unemployment Compensation Commission 
of Virginia, by the Attorney General, this day appeared and 
tendered its answer to an amended petition filed against it 
in this cause, and asked leave to file the same, which leave 
of court is hereby granted, and the said answer is accord-
ingly :filed. 
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ORDER OF JUNE 5, 1944. 
This proceeding came on this day to be heard upon the 
plaintiff's petition, the defendant's answer thereto and the 
Exhibit U. C. C. No. 1 filed with said answer, the plaintiff's 
amended petition, and the defendant's answer thereto and 
was argued by counsel. 
UPON CONSIDERATION "WHEREOF, it appearing to 
the Court from the Stipulation of Facts constituting a part 
of the said Exhibit U. C. C. No. 1 that under the plaintiff's 
plan of remuneration to its agents inaugurated on May 28, 
1940, each agent a'ccepting said plan receives eacb week re-
muneration based upon the size of his debit for such week 
and also receives from time to time certain "spe-
page 27 ~ cial remuneration'' based upon the weekly pre-
mium net incrcnsc resultin~ from such agent's 
activities; that, should such agent's debit during any week 
be less than $100, he receives a fixed amount of remuneration 
for such week wlmtsoen•r mav be the amount of his debit so 
long as it is less than $100; that, should his debit for any week 
be $100 or more, he receives rem1Jneration for such week 
based upon a scale wbich increases $1 for each $10 increase 
in debit; that the debit of such agent increases ·or decreases 
from week to week dependent upon his activities in writing 
new insurance and in p1·cventin~ the lapsing of existing poli-
cies of insuranc:e and is the ref ore substantially and closely 
related to llis activities; that under tlie tcrms of Section 
2(j) (7) (N) of the Virginia Unemployment Compensation 
Act, which section became effective January 1, 1940, the term 
"employment'' as defined in said Act, after December 81, 
1989, shall not include "Service performed by an individual 
for an employing unit as an insurance agent or as an insnr~ 
ance solicitor, if all such service performed bv such individual 
for such employin_g- unit is performed for remuneration solely 
by way of commission''; that eacl1 agent of the plaintiff ac-
cepting the said plan inaugurated l\Iay 28, 1940, is an "insur-
ance a~ent" within the meanin~ of the above quoted portion 
of said Act; that the said special remuneration received by 
such agent is solely by way of commission within the meaning 
of the above quoted portion of said Act; that the remunera-
tion of such a~ent based upon his debit fo:r eacl1 week during 
which his debit is $100 or more is remuneration 
page 28 } solely by way of commission within the meaning 
of the above quoted portion of said Act; and that 
the remuneration of such agent based upon his debit for each 
week during which his debit is under $100 is not remunera., 
tion solely by way of commission within the meaning of the 
• 
• 
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above quoted portion of said Act, doth so adjudge, order, and 
decree. 
THE COURT doth furtlier adjudge, order, and decree that 
the determinations of tl1e Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission entered November 5, 1942, be, and the same are l1ere-
by, reversed; that the services of each agent of the plaintiff 
accepting the said plan inaugurated l\Iay 23, 1940, do not con-
stitute "emplo~·ment" under the said Act for each calendar 
yea1· subsequent to December 31, 1939, .in which the debit of 
such agent for each and every week is $100 or more; that the 
services of each agent of the plaintiff accepting the said plan 
do constitute "employment" under the said Act for each 
calendar year subsequent to December 31, 1939, in whi<'h the 
debit of such agent for any week is less than $100; and that 
the plaintiff as early as practicable file with the Commission 
wage reports with respect to eacl1 agent accepting the said 
plan for each calendar year subsequent to December 31, 1939, 
in which such ae,-ent 's services constitute "en:iplovment" un-
der the terms of this decree showing all earnings of such agent 
during each such calendar year up to $3,000 for such year and 
pay all contributions properly assessable against it -0n ac-
count thereof . 
.. · To the f orcgoing decree the defendant excepted. 
page 29 ~ :MEMORANDUM. 
·:: . Tl1e Defendant Jinving indicated its intention to apply to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir~inia, or one of the 
"judges thereof in vacation, for an appeal from the foregoin~ 
decree, it is further ordered, adjudged. and decreed that this 
decree shall be suspended for a period of four months from 
this date. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, Albert T. August., Clerk of the Chancery Court of the 
City of Richmond, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record, as was ordered by Counsel, and that 
notice in obedience to Section 6339, Code of Virginia, has been 
duly given. 
Teste: 
A. T. AUGUST, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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